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RIGHTEOUSNESS IN GOVERNMENT.
I.
The Constitution of the United States is more than 'a
formula of government; it is the people's covenant of devotion
to freedom justice and righteousness in government.
As a charter, it proceeded from no sovereign save the people
themselves; it is the greatest charter in the world, the charter
of the liberties of more than a hundred million of American
freemen.
Recall the bitter years of "dreadful conflict" and lawless-
ness and civil rebellion preceding the Constitution of 1789; the
jealousies, the hatreds, the self-interests of the thirteen colonies,
successful in war but temporarily inadequate to the duties of
self-government in peace.
Realize how the framers, sitting in Independence Hall, with
great wisdom and tact, secured, by the "more perfect union,"
embodied in the "'Constitution of Philadelphia," a unique 'and
enduring answer to the mighty problems of Federalism; and how
the world beheld the miracle of a free and independent people,
living in free and independent states, surrendering by noble com-
pact that part of the sovereignty of each State which had to do
with international and interstate relations.
There are those who are eager to "break with the past,"
ignore its lessons and flout its traditions. Such as these prefer
not to realize that there are economic laws, forces of human
nature, and judgments of the Almighty, which may be learned
by patience and diligence, but which are immutable and ines-
capable.
But our Fathers knew and believed in these eternal pre-
cepts of righteousness, justice, and respect for the rights of all,
and in this faith they brought forth a mighty nation, conceived
in liberty and dedicated to law and equality before the law.
Aside from the unique solution of the problems of Federal-
ism, charting the States and the Nation in their several courses,
the greatest concept of the Fathers was that of the supremacy
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of law, the supremacy of the Supreme Law, a Law of Laws,
unchangeable save for the deliberate action of the people them-
selves.
Into this Higher Law they wrote in lofty phrase the im-
memorial rights of freemen, sacred as against all government,
inalienable and indefeasible rights which are of the essence of
Freedom itself.
And it was of the essence of their plan that this Higher
Law should be interpreted and made binding by a great Tri-
bunal-a Supreme Court in which was vested the "judicial
power of the United States."
So by the Constitution came the Nation and the Supreme
Court of the Nation to support the Constitution. The Consti-
tution was to be upheld as the Supreme Law of the Land by the
Supreme Court of the Land. Nothing not done "in pursuance
thereof" was to be of any validity or effect.
The interpretation of the Constitution is a judicial act.
The judicial power is in the courts. The final judicial power, is
in the Supreme Court. The judges are sworn to support the
Constitution. If the Court, in the exercise of one of the noblest
functions known to man, the power of entering judgment as
between man and man, or as between man's government and
man, finds that the Constitution is applicable, all else must give
way before it; it must furnish the true and only rule of decision.
For, so long as the Constitution of the people remains unchanged
by the people as they have reserved the right to change it, the
people must be regarded as breathing into the ears of the judges,
and dictating through the judges -the judgment which results
from the high decision aforetime of the people themselves.
The consciences, the intellects, of the judges are moved by. a
profound conviction that the judgment which they enter makes
good the pledged word -of the people and accords with their
plain mandate.
IL
In the fall is forecast a battle royal in Congress. It will
be an attack on the Constitution and the power of the Supreme
Court under the Constitution. The attack will be led by Sena-:
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tors La Follette and Borah. Among their cohorts are the Fed-
eration of Labor, a syndicate comprising hundreds of newspa-
pers, and an army of social workers.
War was declared by Senator La Follette more than a year
ago, when the American Federation of Labor unanimously en-
dorsed his proposal of an amendment to the Constitution, to
the effect that Congress by repassing a bill by a two-thirds ma-
jority could override the Constitution. Senator Borah, more
convinced of the present omnipotence of Conress, has introduced
a bill prohibiting the Supreme Court from sustaining the Consti-
tution as against an Act of Congress except by a vote of seven
of the nine justices.
Of the numerous objections to the La Follette proposal,
perhaps the most evident is that it would accentuate to an intol-
erable extent the present centripetal tendency to center all gov-
erminent and power at Washington. Whatever Senator La Fol-
lette could secure a two-thirds vote for in Congress, would be
a subject of Federal jurisdiction and power, no matter how de-
structive of the rights of the States and the people thereof. In-
stead of having the cooling-time, shown, alas! to be all too
short, provided by the wisdom of the Fathers, we would have
amendments overnight by a two-thirds majority of Congress.
The Constitution and constitutional law would be scrapped, for
the decisions of Congress would be made upon grounds of politi-
cal expediency rather than upon sober grounds of judicial inter-
pretation.
In a nutshell, the proposal is anti-constitutional- and sub-
versive of our liberties, giving the lie to the basis of our peace
and -prosperity during nearly a century and a half of American
freedom.
Turning now to the .Borah proposal, it has. not even the
merit of novelty. For Senator Borah is attempting to thresh
over old straw, to fight an issue that was decided in Congress
a century ago, and decided correctly. At that time the resent-
ment came from the advocates of States' rights who saw the
Constitution upheld as against State laws which invaded national
territory. Now the attack comes from the opposite quarter,
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apparently for the purpose of added centralization of power at
Washington. If the plan were adopted, the opinions of three
justices voting against six would be the law of the land. Six
justices might -vote to sustain the Constitution, yet the Consti-
tution would go down. The plan- would introduce minority rule,
and there is nothing which is more hateful, in' a" court or else-
where.
The argument in favor of the plan involves a distorted
view of the Constitution and of the function of the Supreme
Court in maintaining it. Under the Borah plan Congress might
act by a majority of one in each branch and' the Supreme Court
stand two to one for the Constitution, yet the Constitution: would
be a dead letter. If you will allow your imaginations a mo-
ment's play, you will perceive some of the' many anomalies, which
would' result.
It is argued that Congress is a co-ordinate branch of the
Government, is bound by the Constitution;. its members are
sworn to regard- it, and hience a presumption of constitutionality
arises. We know'that too often this-is-albgal fiction in. theF t~etli
of the facts. We know, too, that this presumption of consti-
tutionality is given by the courts greater. weight than- the facts
justify. But wln, with all respect tolie'action of a-co-ordinati
brancli, the branch of' the Government having the final duty to
decide under and'enforce the Constitution, arrives, by a majority
vote,, at the conclusion, clear to the consciences and intellects
of the, majority of the justices, that the Constitution has been'
violated, there can be no answer except to enter judgment for
tile Constiiution, and. against Congress. To permit a miority
to-rule in the Supreme Court only in cases in which the citizen
claims rights under the Constitihtion, and, to permit the majority
to rule in all other cases, is to sink the Constitution to the lowest
category, from, which, ii can' never again: arise to its 'present
high estate.
But it is argued, the Supreme Court has struck 'down acts
of Congress by a five-to-four vote, and this fact has lessened
respect for the Court and for the law. In view of exaggerations
and misstatements, let us examine the facts. There have been
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less than fifty acts of Congress declared unconstitutional in
nearly i4o years. There have been only seventeen five-to-four
decisions (or majority of one decisions) on acts of Congress.
There have been in the history of the Court only nine cases in
which the Constitution was sustained by a majority of one, and
eight cases in which the aegis of the Constitution was denied by
a vote of one. There have been dissents in other cases, but in
the main the Court has been unanimous. And if you were to
examine today the five-to-four decisions upholding the Consti-
tution, I believe you would wonder at the dissents in most of
the cases, for the history of the Supreme Court is the history of
our Nation, and the Supreme Court has been obliged to decide
cases involving questions enshrouded in partisan bias and popu-
lar clamor. What lawyer would say today that the five justices
of the Supreme Court were not right in ex parte Garland I when,
over the dissent of four of their brethren, they struck down as
ex post facto and void an act of Congress which sought to re-
quire, as a condition precedent to practise at the bar of the
Supreme Court, an oath that the attorney had never taken up
arms against the Union.
We know that the Supreme Court of the United States
only decides actual cases. In cases in which the right claimed
arises out of the Constitution, the Supreme Law of the Land,
the method of decision must be the same as in other cases, or in'
effect we shall have added a new and startling proviso to Article
6: This Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of the Land-
"provided that seven out of the nine justices of the Supreme
Court think it is."
III.
Numerous arguments have been advanced in favor of the
proposed changes.
That the power to sustain the Constitution was a usurped
power. The bibliography of this curious misunderstanding has
grown considerably in the last ten years. But to one who has
14 Val. (U. S.) 333 (1866).
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examined the records and the indisputable evidence that the
power was intended to be conferred and that the adoption of the
Constitution, already in great doubt, would probably never have
taken place except for the belief that the States would be pro-
tected in their rights by the rulings of the Supreme Court sus-
taining the Constitution, there seems to be something almost per-
verse in the persistent misunderstanding of a small group. The
remarks of the framers against a veto by the Suprene Court and
the Executize, have been distorted into a disavowal of the judi-
cial power of the Supreme Court in respect of construing the
Constitution in actual cases. The power of the Supreme Court
is not that of veto. Its exercise involves no political decision or
power. It involves merely the ascertainment of the meaning of
the supreme law.
That the proposed Borah plan does not mean minority rule
because Congress is a large body and Congress has spoken.
There have been curious attempts to avoid the apparently, un-
answerable thesis that whenever a decision is entrusted to, and
necessarily to be exercised by, a body of more than two con-
stituent parts, the decision must be by the majority. (Thus, in
the Constitution of the World Court, a casting vote is given
to the President Judge.) Any machinery by which a minority
rules is prima facie an abnormality, if not an absurdity. But it
is argued that this is not a case of minority rule, because Con-
gress, a very numerous body, has already passed on the question
and has ruled in favor of the constitutionality of its own act.
Of course, the argument ignores the difference between the
function of Congress and the function -of the Supreme Court.
The politicians in Congress make their decisions from politichl
considerations. They may believe that the proposed bill is a
good thing for the country, or for the public, or that it is a
good thing for the record of the individual who voted for it;
militant minorities have a well-known stimulating effect on the
vote of politicians. Theirs is not the final duty to pass upon
the constitutionality of the act. They are not obliged to give,
nor do they always give, reasons for the faith that is in them.
Their vote on one act, involving an implied assertion of their
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belief in its constitutionality, will not return to plague them in
respect of another.
Contrast the situation in a Court, in which the Judges have
no political axes to grind, nor any desire save to comply with
their oaths of office. In written judgments they must give rea-
sons for their decisions, and these reasons are exposed to criti-
cism by the profession and by the public. The pressure to de-
cide in accordance with the majority in Congress and the wishes
of the then administration must be very great, even as against
the sanctity of the oath of office. At any rate, in passiig upon
the meaning of the Supreme Law, they are functioning purely
as judges. The politicians sitting in Congress, in making the
same decisions foi themselves, are functioning as political judges.
A political judge, in or out of Congress, is not likely to inspire
respect or confidence. The point is that mental confusion is
involved in denying that the Borah plan would dethrone ma-
jority rule in the Supreme Court and substitute the rule of the
minority. The judges are acting in a wholly different
sphere and their responsibility and their functioning is distinct
from the responsibility and functioning of the members of
Congress.
That the presunption of the validity of the act of a co-
ordinate branch of the Government should prcclude action by
the Supreme Court sustahzing the Constitution by a five-to-four
vote.
It is said that an adherence to the rule that a statute is not
to be declared unconstitutional, except in plain cases, is in con-
flict with the sustaining of the Constitution by a bare majority.
How can it be a clear case, it is argued, when four out of nine
judges are of the contrary opinion? Any Supreme Court, by a
five-to-four vote, may decide that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law-though four of the
justices think that he used ordinary prudence; or that there was
no evidence to sustain a judgment against a will, although four
out of the nine justices think there was sufficient evidence; or
that there was no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defend-
ant in a murder case, although four of the justices think there
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was a reasonable doubt. The House of Lords sometimes re-
verses decisions of the Court of Appeals (whose judges are said
in general to be of the highest professional standing) by a vote
of three to two. The World Court may enter judgments in
matters of utmost moment by the casting vote of the President
Judge. Congress, in lxth branches. may adopt legislation of
the most sweeping character by a majority of one in each
branch. Wherever deliberations or decisions are called for, and
there is a possibility of difference, the majority must rule. And
the majority which rules is the majority in the particular body.
to which, the decision is entrusted. Thius the Supreme Court of
the United States, by a five-to-four vote, may reverse a decision
of the Circuit Court, which affirmed unanimously a decision of
the District Court. A majority of all the judges who heard the
case may be in favor of the losing party. This fact may be
given weight by the Justices of the Supreme Court, but is uot
conclusive upon their decision. The responsibility is t-heirs.
It may be doubted whether the presumption of constitu-
tionality is a sound or true presumption. Should there be com-
ity as against the Constitution? Should not the question be
decided by the Supreme Court on its merits after a close scru-
tiny, in an effort to decide whether the act and the Constitution
are in antagonism?
When the question is whether the Constitution protects the
citizen against the consequences of executive or legislative ac-
tion, why should there be a presumption that the Constitution
does not afford the protection? Whatever may have been the
calibre of the earlier legislators of the country, could it be seri-
ously contended on behalf of our law-making bodies today that
in care and reverence they consider the scope and extent of their
powers under the Constitution? And even if they do this, does
not the fact remain that the final responsibility is that of the
justices of the Supreme Court? Should this responsibility be
abated or minimized by resorting to a presumption that the
framers and people intended Congress to have any power which
Congress might affect to exercise?
That many of the questions decided by the Supreie Court
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are not questions of law but economic questions. Of course,
many questions of constitutional law have an economic bearing,
but is it correct to say that these questions are not questions of
constitutional law, or, if questions of constitutional law, that
they are controlled by the economic or social point of view of
the person deciding them? Many cases decided by the Supreme
Court have a political significance. Yet we know that such cases
have not been decided from political considerations any more
than Chief Justice Marshall made- his famous and fearless de-
cision in the case of United States v. Aaron Burr2 from politi-
cal considerations. Ex parte Garland 3 may be taken as typi-
cally a political case, yet four Republican judges were in the ma-
jority in favor of a Southern lawyer whom Congress would have
deprived of a constitutional right. Pollock v. Farmers' Trust
Company 4 had grave economic consequences upon our system
of Federal taxation and is a favorite theme for the critics of
the Supreme Court to harp upon, with a crescendo on the al-
leged change of opinion of one of the justices. But who doubted
that these cases were clearly cases of law to be decided by judges
sitting in a court rather than politicians sitting in Congress?
The question whether it is compatible with the concepts of Amer-
ican constitutional freedom to discriminate as between union
and non-union labor so that unions and union laborers have a
favored position before the law, and so that a non-union man is
handicapped in various ways, may have its. economic implica-
tions but is necessarily a question of law.
Freedom of contract is a part of American constitutional
freedom. As between the sphere of legislative power to -pre-
vent contracts contrary to the general welfare and the realm of
unassailable individual initiative-to invade which sanctuary
would be conceded by all to be a grossly unfair, arbitrary and
unconstitutional aggression by Congress-there must be a
boundary fixed by the "thou shalt not" of the Constitution. If
freedom is to remain anything more than an airy concept, this
IFed. Cas. No. 14,693; 25 Fed. Cas. 55 (187) ; see also 4 Cranch (U. S.)470. N Note z supra.
a 158 U. S. 6oz (x895).
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boundary must be marked off by judges unaffected by the po-
litical view of the moment. The most ardent advocate of the
police power must concede that, if Congress is to be the final
judge as to the scope of the police power, the Constitution be-
comes worthless. There must be some contracts, to prohibit
or limit which would be incompatible with freemen living in a
free State. On one side it is said that freedom of contract is
the rule and restriction the exception; on the other, Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes points out the numerous respects in which the state
has interfered to limit the generality of freedom of contract.
After all it may be a question of terminology, but is it not
the sounder view that, no matter what the economic or political
consequences are in these cases, the question remains a question
of law for judges in court, because the inquiry is as to the
meaning and scope of the words of the Constitution as applied
to given states of fact, and, above all, in some of the most im-
portant cases, is an effort to answer the question,. "What is
Freedom?" Is it compatible with a free government, for ex-
ample, that no one should be permitted to carry on any business
unless all his employees are members of a union? And if a
man wishes to attempt an open shop or continue an open shop,
can the legislature make it a crime on his part to fail to continue
in his employ a union worker? Suppose Congress should at-
tempt an exactly contrary policy, prohibiting labor union
activities altogether, would the millions of union men of the
country regard America as a free country? On the other hand,
if Congress should attempt to favor union men-as against non-
union men, would America remain a free'state? Read Adair
v. United States 5 and Coppage v. Kansas ' and consider the
consequences either way.
That our system of constitutiotal limitations is unlike the
British ,ay and the British way is the better. The present
writer has been subjected to arguments such as, "Why a written
Constitution?" Great Britain has none. Parliament is supreme
and the British institutions have survived. The British, in 1911,
'2o8U. S. 161 (igo8).
236 U. S. 1 (1915).
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even abolished the veto of the House of Lords. Why not abol-
ish the veto of the Supreme Court? Why isn't the British sys-
tem better?
The answer is, Great Britain has no real constitution as we
understand the word "'constitution." The real protection of
the British is found in the homogeneity, intelligence, and the
sense of fair play of the British people and their Parliaments.
The most enthusiastic American, however, will not assert that
we are a homogeneous people or that we are as law-abiding as
the British.
If the British Parliament were so minded, it could, with
absolute power, enact and put into effect the equivalent of nearly
fifty acts of Congress which have been inoperative in the United
States because at variance with the fundamental law and beyond
the power of the representatives of the people. Some of these
acts of Congress have been declared void because they violate
the rights of the States, but many of them have been stricken
down because they violate the rights of individuals, because the
efforts of Congress were incompatible with freedom itself. Pro
tanto Congress sought to enslave the people contrary to the will
of the people themselves as set forth in their chosen instrument.
And the Supreme Court enforced the rights of the people as
against the aggression of- Congress upon these rights. Read
over the bill of rights, re-read some of the cases in which its
sacred phrases have been made a living power for justice, re-
flect that in Great Britain there is nothing except tradition (or
revolution) to prevent Parliament from acting counter to any of
the principles of elemental justice and fair play embodied in our
bill of rights. Parliament can compel a man in a criminal case
to be a witness against himself. Congress attempted it but was
foiled by the Supreme Court in Counsehman v. Hitchcock.7 Par-
liament may take private property for public use without just
compensation; the United States was prevented from doing this
only by decisions of the Supreme Court.8
'142 U. S. 547 (189z).
"U. S. Y. New River Collieries Co., 276 Fed. 69o (192I), affirmed by
Supreme Court, May 21, 1923, and reported in 43 Sup. Ct. 565.
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Senator Borah. the author of -one- of the proposals, ino his
speech of August 7, 1911, on the subject of recall of judges,
paid brilliant tribute to the. Constitution and the Supreme Court:
"Would' any American, looking back over such scenes
and realizing that perhaps the difficulties- which we have.
known are small compared with those- which we are- to,
know, burden a court with any other consideration or sub-
ject it to any other influences than that of a. full, faithful,
and fearless. construction of the Constitution, of the laws of
the land, regardless of the- temnporary benefits, or supposed
benefits, to be derived from a temporizing construction?
The people, had made the constitution. It had been referred
to them, and they had approved it. It was the people's law,
and John Marshall, in the supreme majesty of his genius,
made it the title deed to nationality, as the people intended
it. should be. Passing conditions and temporary circum-
stances would have modified it, but he. (lid, not accede to
these conditions or circumstances.
"Dbes the executive,, the -legislature; furnish the hearing
and the protection for- the friendless which- are furnished
by the courts?.
"It would necessarily bring it into politics; you could
not prevent it. Merciful justice! Hi ve we not enough poli-
tics in our system already, such as- it is? Shall we now-
include the courts. You are much mistaken if you think
the people want more politics; they zant less. If you will
give me a law-making department which.is intelligent and
true to the people, an executive department fearless and
true, with the judicial system which we now have, I will
show- you the best governed and the happiest people in the
vorld.
"When the people have written the law, then let us*
-have an independent judge, free from any political fear,
to interpret the law as written until the people rewrite it.
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"Not a court beyond the possibility of error, not a
court whose opinions are to be deemed above the reach of
fair and honest criticism, but a court which, whether viewed
as to the reach and scope and power of its jurisdiction, or
as to its influenwe and standing, its ability and learning, its
dedication and consecration to the service of .mankind, is
the greatest tribunal for order and justice yet created among
m e n .
j
The function of the Constitution and the Supreme Court is
resented as an interference with the people's will. But the Con-
stitution is the final word in the will of the people and the solemn
pronouncement of the Suireme Court as to its meaning is the
real voice of the people. All that the Constitution and the Su-
preme Court restrain is the lawless attempt of Congress, inad-
vertently or wilfully, to frustrate the will of the people and to
seize for themselves the supreme power in the state.
In his admirable and fascinating work on "The Spirit of
Common Law," Dean Pound elaborates the criticism of our
system in practice, that it tends to prevent the free exercise of
the legitimate desires of the people. One's concepts as to the
extent of the need for ready change may depend upon one's
philosophical temperament, but what is there that the people
have really wanted and that would be good for them that they
have been denied by the Constitution as construed by the Su-
preme Court? Two, and only two, constitutional amendments
have been passed to meet the decision of the Supreme Court,
one preventing actions by individuals against states and the other
permitting an income tax. Humbly I concur with Senator Borah
in believing that the Supreme Court is not infallible. Perhaps
we would choose different illustrations of its lack of inerrancy.
While one's own concepts of righteousness in government may,
in rare cases, prevent one from giving adherence to the Supreme
Court's decisions, nevertheless, the fact that the final decision is
made by a Court composed of judges uninfluenced by political
considerations and that in close or doubtful cases the views of
the judges are embodied in written judgments, is a boon to good
government.
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One of the strongest reasons for the existence of a World
Court is that it will tend to furnish a continuous, consistent and
permanent body of international law. In like manner, the dis-
cussion in, and decisions by, the Supreme Court of the United
States, of fundamental and far-reaching problems of natural
justice and elemental freedom, develop a-tradition of that right-
eousness in government which exalteth a nation.
Ira Jewcll Wiliains.
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